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Abstract: Growing pressure from politicians and corporations has thrown into question the very 
legitimacy of opposition and critique. A language of political affirmation has confused and misled the 
public, driving many to adopt a cynical attitude to politics. The result has been a rapid decline of 
legitimate critique, the rise of populism, and a growing tendency to squelch civil disobedience with a 
militarized police force. The introduction to the special issue considers the role of the 
complicit/dissenting intellectual in history and literature, politics and law. It explores the genealogy of 
the terms, as well as conditions for their appearance in our contemporary world. The introduction 
follows the advice of leading scholars, who contributed to this issue, in calling for “solidarity between 
struggles”— when one extends a sense of right and wrong beyond one’s immediate identity or a vague 
universal understanding of “right.” 
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Nitzan LEBOVIC  
 
Complicity and Dissent, or Why We Need Solidarity between Struggles 
 
Contemporary life in the Middle East and the United States offers ample opportunities for discussions 
of complicity and dissent. The political language shared by the two places offers paradoxes in which 
complicity and dissent are blended: privatization is presented as a form of economic participation; 
military action and police brutality strengthen democracy; security, immigration, and crime are fused 
so that government can combat “internal enemies.” In both places, as in other populist regimes, it is 
common to speak of social equality in order to exclude refugees, or to cite “rights” to empower the 
majority and the powerful. Such paradoxes undermine the possibility of differentiating complicity from 
dissent, eroding that essential separation between a friend and an enemy, treason and loyalty. Now 
that it is essential to differentiate complicity from dissent, how shall we begin? 
For the past few decades -- while considering the neo-liberal revolution of the 1980s, the fall of 
Berlin wall, and the revival of fundamentalist and populist politics -- thinkers have pointed to a global 
transformation that is cultural and political. In self-identified democracies, growing pressure from 
conservatives and corporations has thrown into question the very legitimacy of opposition and 
critique. The spread of a language of political affirmation has confused and misled the public, driving 
many to adopt a cynical attitude to politics. The result has been a rapid decline of legitimate critique, 
the rise of populism, and a growing tendency to squelch civil disobedience with a militarized police 
force (Müller 42). The political effect, at least where democracy is concerned, has been disastrous. In 
my own experience I have discovered that any attempt to question Israeli militarism, populism, or 
neoliberalism runs into stout resistance, let alone any talk of Palestinian nationalism. In the late 1990s 
a Palestinian friend and I spoke out routinely against our own regimes. Nowadays we would be beaten 
(or worse), without knowing which side the blows were coming from. When taking a political position 
is so dangerous, what motivation is there to be involved, to care about the other, to separate 
complicity from dissent and cooptation from critique? Our experience, in Israel and Palestine, shows 
that during the past two decades many of our close friends and family members have chosen to step 
away from politics, sometimes into outright escapism. Others, myself included, have emigrated to 
countries that seemed more open, that guaranteed critique and freedom of expression as part of 
democracy. But history has a way of catching up with one. As an immigrant critical of his country of 
origin, I find myself, once again, and from afar, in the unenviable position of defending critique itself 
to conservative loyalists or liberal moderates who push instead for cooperation, whether active or 
passive. Rejection of that approach, they make clear, will keep me and my kind from power and 
money—if we’re lucky. In that context, complicity is not always an active ideological position; it can 
be, particularly in academic circles, a quiet and nonideological stance that appeals to essentialists, or 
to “absolute certainties in the form of sovereign and universal laws” (Bloch, Craft 14). In other words, 
while the professoriate—in line with neoliberal forces—has come to see identity, on the one hand, and 
universal values, on the other hand, as a legitimate form of critique, more radical dissent is 
interpreted as unprofessional, too political, counterproductive. Most egregious are expressions of 
solidarity with other struggles, what radical feminists called “solidarity between struggles”— when one 
extends a sense of right and wrong beyond one’s immediate identity or a vague universal 
understanding of “right.”1 While an identitarian or universalist stance could be construed to offer a 
position of power, solidarity must align one’s fate with that of a seemingly doomed opposition. 
 
1. The Role of the Intellectual 
There is nothing new in this demand for communal or institutional complicity, or the institutional home 
that brings together those ready to comply and those who demand complicity. Complicity sheds a 
strange light on agency; it changes the environment, but it does not have to act. As Marc Bloch 
explained in 1940, it does not take more than passivity, or “laziness and cowardice” in his words, to 
become complicit. Reflecting on the anti-Semitic regulations imposed on France during the German 
occupation, and his own failure to stand up to them, one of the two fathers of the Annales School 
clarified: “Out of laziness and cowardice we let things take their course. We feared the opposition of 
the mob… We preferred to lock ourselves into the fear-haunted tranquility of our studies” (Strange 
172). This “mob” needs the cooperation of the elite more than it needs to be in the majority. As Mark 
                                                 
1 The term was used by Mexico’s Seminario Marxista Leninista Feminista de Lesbianas in order to unite different 
struggles against the regime under one banner. For a short discussion of “the work of solidarity” and the call for 
“solidarity between struggles,” see Borland. 
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Bray shows in Antifa: The Anti-Fascist Handbook, “It doesn’t take that many fascists to make fascism” 
(140). Indeed, in both Mussolini’s and Hitler’s cases, the number of party members was quite small—7 
to 8% of the overall population in Italy in 1922, 1.3% in Germany in 1933. But if ideological 
fundamentalists amount only to a minority, where does the rest of the support come from? The rest, 
we argue in this issue, comes from different forms of complicity and the rejection of solidarity between 
struggles. “These regimes,” said Bray, “consolidated their power by winning the support of 
conservative elites” (140) and on those liberals whose “alternative to militant anti-fascism is to have 
faith in the power of rational discourse, the police, and the institutions of government.” (158)  Among 
those elites one must acknowledge the intellectual elite. 
Let us consider one way that writers, scholars, and philosophers have supported coercive regimes. 
Following Hannah Arendt’s reports on the Eichmann trial, Gershom Scholem criticized her for a lack of 
Ahavat Israel, “love of Israel.” For Scholem, Arendt’s stress on mechanisms that worked across 
identities and were shared by perpetrator and victim, seemed nothing less than treasonous. In 
contrast, Arendt’s well-known response was that while her identity as a Jew was a “pre-political” fact, 
a love that embraced an entire people, any people, struck her as unwise. “I am Jewish myself,” she 
wrote; “I don’t love myself or anything I know that belongs to the substance of my being” (Arendt and 
Scholem, 206-210). If identity was “pre-political,” what was the political? For Arendt, it had to do with 
the condition that enables free speech: “To speak politically about the matter,” Arendt argued, would 
be “to discuss the question of patriotism . . . [which] is impossible without constant opposition and 
critique” (Arendt and Scholem 207). In other words, a political discussion of identity cannot be 
affirmative and must be critical. But how critical? Is there a sort of critique that is separate from one’s 
sense of self or a more general understanding of identity? Is the critical principle, one that Kant—and 
Arendt following him—equated with reason, peace, internal cooperation, and cultural development, 
devoid of self-affirmation? (Arendt, Lectures 52). And if so, how come Arendt herself came to oppose 
the civil rights movement after the enrollment of nine African American students at the otherwise all-
white Little Rock Central High School in 1957, siding with the opponents of integration?2 
We must not think of critique as an autonomous intellectual endeavor. Arendt saw it in the context 
of a philosophical tradition, taking inspiration from Kant, but like him failing to identify with struggles 
that were not specifically hers—that would have been a real expression of truth in the face of power. 
As Thomas Docherty argues in this issue, it is difficult to avoid self-affirmation, but not so difficult is 
seeking positive reinforcement. Even sophisticated thinkers, Scholem and Arendt among them, have 
always demanded a form of complicity; if not with state institutions, then with professional ones. The 
sociologist Zygmunt Bauman identified this tendency with the pursuit of symbolic power and expertise 
in the academic community: “Standing up to the status quo demands courage, considering the 
terrifying might of the powers supporting it; courage, however, is a quality which intellectuals, once 
known for their bravura, or downright heroic fearlessness, have lost in their dash for new roles and 
‘niches’ as experts, academic gurus and media celebrities” (50). Solidarity between struggles implies a 
clear understanding of complicity and dissent, including in those cases where one becomes the other. 
As Chad Kautzer’s article in this issue demonstrates, Arendt betrayed her earlier call for dissent and 
joined the forces of affirmation and complicity due to her own confusion about American politics; she 
forgot “her critique of violence and the violent logic of a different order.” 
Dedicating an issue to complicity and dissent forces us to explain each term, as well as their areas 
of congruence. As rhetorical figures, complicity and dissent are opposites; one demands agreement, 
the other disagreement. But do they really mark political opposites? Is complicity the same as 
accepting an affirmative approach to one’s identity? Is it apolitical, as Arendt argued, rather than the 
opposite of political dissent? To put it otherwise, history provides countless examples of situations that 
fall somewhere between the two poles. So what does it mean to be a dissenting accomplice or a 
complicit dissenter? How can we build a systematic analysis of the political, grounded in the solidarity 
among the many different struggles with power? This issue tries to answer such questions by a brief 
series of semantic, historical, and literary readings of complicity and dissent. 
 
 
2. The etymology and semantics of complicity/dissent 
The word complicity, as Stephen Clingman explained in his article on Nazi Germany and apartheid, 
comes from the Latin complicitas, “derived from complex . . . meaning ‘to entwine around a person or 
                                                 
2 It is interesting to note that Arendt failed to live up to her own ideals: during the Eichmann trial she mocked the 
Mizrahi Jews in attendance; as part of her critique of Brown v. Board of Education, she attacked black activists. For 
a critical consideration of those failings, see Gines. 
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thing’” (281). Indeed, complicity expresses a variety of cooperative political forms whose ambiguity is 
anchored in an institutional language. In this issue we have gathered a series of articles questioning 
conventional attitudes toward complicity and dissent. As contributors were chosen for their 
commitment to dissenting and critical worldviews, none was likely to offer a particularly 
accommodating picture for champions of unity, harmony, and the rule of the big fish. Dissent is not 
only an abstract political or ethical term; it is a way of life. It must begin at our actual and institutional 
homes, with our ability to imagine an alternative: For ourselves as well as for others.  
The word dissent comes from the Latin dissentire, “differ in sentiment, disagreement.” Its historical 
semantics connect the affective to the political. When the word is inserted into Google’s Ngram search 
engine, which searches a vast database of books and charts the frequency of a term’s use over time, 
one notices that it was widely used during revolutionary eras. The use of the word reached its peak 
shortly before the Spring of Nations in 1848, and again since the 1960s, and its popularity has been 
on the rise since the early 1980s. It is discussed, in the present, in the context of current democratic 
norms and the memory of oppression. Following on Arendt’s anti-totalitarian plea for dissent and 
critique, Jacques Rancière explained in On the Shores of Politics that the political exists thanks to 
democracy. If democracy is founded on the possibility of dissent—dis-agreement—then there is no 
politics without the actual expression of dissent (94). For Rancière the political is conditioned on the 
pursuit of equality as the ultimate goal, and equality assumes an open and a critical conversation in 
the public sphere. For him, “politics arises from a count of community ‘parts.’ . . . [It] exists when the 
natural order of domination is interrupted by the institution of a part of those who have no part” (Dis-
agreement 6, 11). In other words, politics and democracy are codependent, and without disagreement 
neither one is possible.  
In a recent book on “agonistic democracy,” Dimitris Vardoulakis drew on the thinking of Hannah 
Arendt, Jacques Rancière, and Jacques Derrida to explore the “distinction between unconditionality 
and sovereignty or . . . between democracy and sovereignty, between judgment and justification. . . . 
Instead of separating them, what matters is the fact that their distinction necessitates ‘a principle of 
resistance or of dissent’” (39). Building on Rancière’s analysis of democracy, the thinker Wendy Brown 
argued that “democracy stands opposed not only to tyranny and dictatorship . . . but also to a 
contemporary phenomenon in which rule transmutes into governance and management in the order 
that neoliberal rationality is bringing about” (20). Contemporary academic institutions argue in favor 
of democracy but act in accordance with neoliberal protocols. They show the face of multiculturalism 
but only as far as their ranking and endowment allows. Brown explained this paradox in plain terms: 
“The saturation of higher education by market rationality has converted higher education from a social 
and public good to a personal investment in individual futures, futures construed mainly in terms of 
earning capacity” (181). Such saturation has eroded critique, opposition, solidarity and dissent by 
“vanquishing the rationale for unions, consumer groups, or other forms of economic solidarity” or 
giving absolute precedence to Homo economicus over Homo politicus (65, 99). 
 
3. The complicity/dissent of the intellectual 
If in the 1940s Victor Klemperer and George Orwell, Primo Levi and the young Hannah Arendt followed 
the impact of the Holocaust on democratic culture. Their ideal was the public intellectual who placed 
justice before any other consideration. The worst of all denunciations was “Collaborator!” One thinks 
of Julien Benda’s Treason of the Intellectuals (La trahison des clercs, 1927). Benda has recently been 
identified as “a fierce defender of the autonomy of intellectual life,” his book being the basis of a set of 
“transcendental truths” (Wurgaft 11). Zvi Ben-Dor Benite shows in this issue that Benda’s argument 
became “code for an array of intellectual modes of behavior and choices concerning their responsibility 
towards their vocation.” Ben-Dor Benite rejects both Romanticism’s “timeless morality” and 
contemporary “integral realism” in favor of an older but more explicit “positioning” of ruler and sage, a 
relationship mapped out by Kongzi (aka Confucius) and held up as a political ideal throughout the 
history of imperial China. Ergo, the first commitment of the intellectual is not to abstractions of justice 
and truth, but to a clear-eyed understanding of power relations. Maria Mühle confirms in her 
theoretical analysis that “There cannot be . . . any place for politics beyond power.” For that reason, 
“power and counter-power are to be thought in their intrinsic interlacing” as a condition for resistance.  
A bit more than a decade after The Treason of the Intellectuals appeared, Marc Bloch wrote 
Strange Defeat (L’Étrange Défaite, 1940). In contrast to Benda’s judgmental tone, Bloch, a 
distinguished French historian of Jewish descent, later executed by the Gestapo, wrote a more 
reflective account of his time, a personal record of the failure of the intellectuals. As mentioned above, 
he used “laziness” and “cowardice” as synonyms for complicity—intellectual, economic, and political—
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and pointed out how the failure to express solidarity disturbed the social and political texture of his 
time (104). 
But are these works, and particularly the reflections triggered by the Second World War, the right 
model for our contemporary thinking on complicity and dissent? Or has the anti-totalitarian Benda-
model overshadowed any chance for dissent, even within democracy? (Rosanvallon). Does the 
interruptive mode of democratic politics, a la Arendt, Rancière, and Brown, enable, even assume, the 
existence of complicity? In order to answer such questions, we need to pay more attention to the 
specific power relations and intellectual discourses that occupy the heart of our post-1945 political 
consciousness. The articles by Sa’ed Atshan and Raef Zreik join Ben-Dor Benite and Docherty in 
examining strategies of intellectual survival and dissent. While Atshan applies his findings to develop a 
positive view of the Palestinian intellectual in Palestine and the United States, Zreik is calling for a 
critical examination of complicity among both academics and politicians. I will return below to the 
specific interpretations proposed in this issue, but before I do, a few words about the historical model. 
 
4. History: Complicity in Nazi Germany 
The concepts of complicity and dissent framed the discussions of power relations inspired by the rise 
of fascism. Hitler’s and Mussolini’s insistence on unquestioning obedience to the state, and the threat 
of retribution for every sign of dissent were not fully appreciated by historians until recently. Mark 
Mazower’s Hitler’s Empire (2008) and Timothy Snyder’s Bloodlands (2010) demonstrate that without 
massive and varied forms of complicity, the Nazis would not have been able to hold onto much of their 
occupied territory, let alone carry out the massive slaughter they accomplished. Ukrainians, Latvians, 
Romanians, Hungarians, Frenchmen, and Russians joined the Waffen-SS, making up international 
divisions that Himmler kept secret from the racially puritanical Führer (Mazower 416-70). As Robert 
Ericksen’s Complicity in the Holocaust (2012) shows, German universities and churches took the lead 
in declaring their institutional approval of the Nazis, portraying Hitler as “God’s gift to Germany,” 
making complicity a civic, as well as intellectual, requirement (21). Complicity was necessary not only 
where it contributed to a murderous campaign, but also for a stable administration, intellectual 
cooptation, and governmental autonomy. Yet the boundary between complicity and dissent was not 
evident. As Dan Stone (2014) and Neil Levi and Michael Rothberg (2018) showed, a postwar politics of 
memory did much to erode the boundary: antifascist consensus relied on a suppression of the truth 
about the widespread wartime collaboration; complicity can be seen both as a strategy of dissent and, 
simultaneously, as a requirement for ideological continuity on both sides, German and French (Stone 
viii).  
As Thomas Docherty argues in this issue, the intellectual’s function “is to raise embarrassing 
questions publicly, to confront orthodoxy and dogma”; this function becomes part of “the economics of 
free speech” in democratic society. During the Nazi time a simple iteration, humorous or unintentional, 
could get someone killed. After the war, the ideological dictates of the Nazi regime were forbidden, but 
not the underlying exclusionary mechanisms; in response to the chorus of contrite apologies from 
Germans who with their next breath insisted that the Jews had it coming, post–World War II thinkers 
from the Jewish Italian writer Primo Levi to the American sociologist Everett Hughes pondered 
ideological continuity under the guise of dissent or regret (4-8). A rhetoric of shame served the 
purpose of self-cleansing while the victim was implicitly blamed. Levi identified this rhetoric as an 
extension of a moral “gray zone” the Nazis encouraged in the camps, a move that erased 
responsibility, fostering a more efficient climate of exclusion, dehumanization, and killing (37).3 From 
a different angle, as the historian Martina Kessel has recently shown, Nazis used anti-Semitic jokes as 
a cultural performance that was meant to reinforce the exclusionary mechanisms of the racist regime 
without being explicitly racist (380-401). In other words, contextualizing and historicizing the 
(totalitarian, in this case) discourse enables us to ask new questions about disciplinary mechanisms, 
and further, where one succeeds or fails to bend them. As Klemperer put it, “There were no great 
differences to be registered, no, in fact there were absolutely none at all… [S]upporters and 
opponents, beneficiaries and victims all conformed to the same models” (10). The only way for the 
historian to avoid the temptation of such uniform models, dictated from above or accepted from 
                                                 
3 “In the Lager, and outside, there exist gray, ambiguous persons, ready to compromise. The extreme pressure of 
the Lager tends to increase their ranks; they are the rightful owners of a quota of guilt . . . and the vectors and 
instruments of the system’s guilt” (Levi 37). Forty years before the publication of Levi’s last book in 1986, Karl 
Jaspers gave a series of lectures, later published as Collective Guilt, in which he made a courageous attempt to 
clarify this problematic terrain. For a good analysis of this topic, see the article by Thomas Docherty in the present 
issue. 
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below, is to pay attention to discursive phenomena as a process and not as a single event. In simple 
historical terms, it will be a mistake to separate the Nazi stress on linguistic and cultural 
Gleichschaltung (coordination), from the ambiguous “Gray Zone,” which extended beyond identities 
and time periods, as Primo Levi argued (153-83). As a third generation to Holocaust survivors in the 
state of Israel, I have witnessed such exclusionary mechanisms in action, while hanging to the 
absolute separateness of victims, for justification.  
 
4. Law and Literature: Postwar 
As Clingman explains, after World War II the concept of complicity found a place in the laws created to 
adjudicate war crimes, and in the post-1945 politics of memory. Crucial to this were the Nuremberg 
Trials (1945–1946), the de-Nazification of Germany (1946–1951), and the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1951). In particular, the last framed complicity 
as an ethical-legal issue for the first time. From the rise of apartheid in South Africa (1948) to the rash 
of genocides in the former Yugoslavia (1992–1995), Rwanda (1994), Darfur (2003–2004), and 
Myanmar (2016-17) gave the concept increased legal-political significance. The creation of the 
Palestinian refugee problem (the Nakba in 1948), and later the occupation of the West Bank (1967), 
forced legal scholars, historians, and authors to consider the complex situation of a victim of 
persecution who turned into an oppressor (Zertal). The political translation of the new discourse 
encouraged thinkers to reposition complicity and dissent in the heart of modern political 
representation and symbolic order. 
The literary world readily engaged with this theme, and some of the best literary writing of the last 
three decades addressed complicity and dissent in South Africa and Palestine. The outstanding 
representatives of this trend are Nadine Gordimer and J. M. Coetzee. In addition, literary scholars 
have investigated the veiled expression of complicity and dissent in everyday language as opposed to 
baldly ideological statements. As Thomas Docherty wrote in Complicity, “Complicity, considered now in 
. . . linguistic terms, is established through…a reduced lexicon: the change in the language is actually 
a reduction of the vocabulary available for discussion and debate. It leads to the assertion that the 
existing conditions in which we live constitute something called ‘reality’” (19). Docherty sees these 
questions addressed in Julian Barnes’s The Noise of Time (2014), which traces the ways Shostakovitch 
worked under Stalin, “where cowardice becomes not so much a question of morality, but a simple 
condition of survival” (77). Indeed, Docherty argues, “in totalitarian regimes… complicity with power 
reduces us to bare humanity, a ‘technique for survival’ as Barnes has it” (78). 
Fiction allows us to consider how formal cooperation and disagreement echo within the private 
sphere. It does so slowly and gradually, while building a whole universe around a character. In this 
issue, Lital Levy connects this discourse to the family, focusing on the function and place of the child, 
its most vulnerable unit. In this context, the meeting between the private and the public must be 
mediated by the public language of the law and the private language of psychology. Both are 
institutionalized and supervised by the state, while claiming to keep their autonomy. Drawing on 
novels by Nadine Gordiner and Hisham Matar, Levy explains, “The scholarly research on child 
witnessing, based primarily in psychology and legal studies, is heavily focused on the issue of 
suggestibility during testimony. But the contemporary novel itself is rife with child witnesses of 
trauma.” Both Docherty and Levy point to the epistemological and ontological role of language in 
facilitating truth and lies, quietist and rebellious approaches to political reality. As Arendt argued, 
where regular distortions of the truth are common, the ground is primed for “abolishing the capacity 
for distinguishing between truth and falsehood, between reality and fiction… The outstanding negative 
quality of the totalitarian elite is that the Leader, like a talisman, assures the ultimate victory of lie 
and fiction over truth and reality” (Origins 385). It is remarkable that Arendt missed, in this context, 
the pretense of intellectual autonomy as an enabler of exclusion. Intellectuals as Carl Schmitt and 
Martin Heidegger, authors as Ernst Jünger, and institutions such as the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute were 
not simply “treasonous.” In fact, Jünger and Heidegger may have criticized, in private, the crudeness 
of Nazis. But they did not care enough about dissent, to ask themselves about complicity; they were 
more invested in their own symbolic power. Arendt would fail here again, three decades later. 
In Complicities: The Intellectual and the Apartheid (2002), Marc Sanders showed that neither 
complicity nor dissent are unitary: there are many complicities, countless means to dissenting. He also 
dwelt on the role of intellectuals in building up an ethics of complicity/dissent around those 
multiplicities. In the book, Sanders traced both the forced and the willing complicity of intellectuals 
with the apartheid regime, as well as paradigmatic cases of dissent. His intellectual history begins with 
Karl Jaspers and goes via Frantz Fanon, Jean-Paul Sartre, Antonio Gramsci, and Jacques Derrida, to 
Gordimer and Coetzee. While the complicity of the intellectual class with totalitarianism always 
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involves the textual, legal, and explicitly political, Sanders read intellectual complicity as the grounds 
upon which notions of responsibility and political awareness can be created as well. In order to test 
those murky waters, Sanders analyzed testimony and discussions from South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission hearings held between 1995 and 2002. As he demonstrates, the testimony 
offered countless examples of the different modes of allying with and denouncing the regime. 
Complicity, he found, transcended not only the boundaries of the most obvious oppositions but the 
scientific boundaries used to separate life from death. (As Walter Benjamin warned, “Even the dead 
will not be safe from the enemy if he is victorious” [391]). Sanders’s conclusion was that we ought to 
talk about “complicities” rather than a single form of complicity. This complexity did not imply a 
relaxed demand for responsibility but a more stringent one. The articles by Sa’ed Atshan and Vincent 
Lloyd in this issue point to the dissenting intellectual, one who identifies with a minority under coercive 
political force—be it a Palestinian or an African-American—as a paradigmatic case for engaging with a 
world full of complicities. Lloyd’s intellectual responds with the bold coupling of rage and dignity: He 
realizes that rage, and not respectability, will result with “an embrace of self-care and loving 
community…so that his anger can continue to rage.” Atshan attaches dignity to “a sense of 
accountability to Palestinian society, and the requisite disavowal of regimes of power.” 
The ambivalent and complex sources of complicity demonstrate the difficulty of reaching 
agreement on its precise meaning and operation. Even the dry legal definition of the term offered by 
the Genocide Convention of 1946, instrumental in the special international tribunals convened for the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, confused complicity as a “stand-alone crime” and as a form of legal 
liability (Greenfield). 
At the same time, this ambivalence supplied a fertile ground for literature and literary criticism. 
One thinks of Arendt’s critique of Stefan Zweig’s naïve complicity and proudly apolitical perspective: 
“It never occurred to him that, politically speaking, it might be an honor for him to stand outside the 
law when all men were no longer equal before it” (“Stefan” 59). She contrasted this with Franz Kafka’s 
“society of ‘nobodies’” and with the commitment of Hermann Broch, Karl Kraus, and Bertold Brecht to 
investigating the “role of inverts” (“Between” 162). 
The literary imagination allows for more sophisticated and complex understandings of complicity 
and dissent, beyond mere divisions between apolitical and political, and even between complicity and 
dissent. Arendt was interested in the authors I named because, in addition to possessing keen critical 
and political sensitivities, they explored the minds of those who did not. One might think here of the 
Kafkaesque magistrate in Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians (1982) or the Kafkaesque registrar and 
clerks in José Saramago’s All the Names (Todos os Nomes, 1999), both exploring the limits of dissent 
while cooperating with the regime (Both the fictional protagonist and the very real authors respond, as 
Lloyd would predict, with rage.) As Raef Zreik demonstrates here, the novelists Ghassan Kanafani and 
Elias Khoury join Coetzee and Saramago by unpacking the complex weaving of quiet resistance and 
loud obedience—or the reverse.  
 
5. Discourse: Neoliberalism and Complicity in Academia 
Literature is able to depict the gradual, almost unseen process that leads from democracy to 
totalitarianism. Karl Löwith, taking his cue from Nietzsche’s literary fantasies, wrote of the “total 
politicization of life,” a condition Giorgio Agamben sees in contemporary neoliberal democracy (71). 
Docherty refers to the mechanisms of “total politicization” described by Klemperer during the 1930s 
and 1940s as “a reduction of the vocabulary available for discussion and debate” (Docherty 19). For 
Docherty, as for Sanders, intellectuals and academic institutions became complicit with power when 
they abandoned the vocabulary of dissent, adopting instead the lexicon of petty politics, social norms, 
and economic dictates. As Alice Gast, the president of London’s Imperial College (she was previously 
president of my own institution, Lehigh University), put it, professors are expected to behave like 
“small business owners” (Docherty 46). Needless to mention, business owners are not expected to 
offer critiques; they are expected to sell their products to happy clients.  
Why do those examples matter to our discussion of complicity and dissent? Raising embarrassing 
questions and confronting truisms require both historical and discursive sensitivity. Both Primo Levi 
and Edward Said saw this as a critical and spiritual ideal. A serious consideration of complicity and 
dissent requires a deep understanding of the intricate operations of the “economy of free speech” in 
our society and others. Examining this economy from a Foucauldian perspective, Maria Mühle argues 
here, opens up a layer usually hidden from political interpreters. Foucault’s work on plebs, Mühle 
writes, helped expose “all those lives destined to pass beneath any discourse and disappear.” In other 
words, any analysis of exiting power relations, and their exclusionary mechanisms, must consider the 
meeting point of explicit and implicit ideological structures, exposed and hidden interests, upper- and 
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lower-class references and known and unknown historical contexts. It needs to consider, then, 
solidarity between struggles. 
If we wish to understand complicity and dissent in the academy, we must scrutinize not just other 
intellectuals and institutions, but ourselves. Anthropologists are uniquely situated to carry out this 
exercise, and the work of Fiona Wright, Smadar Lavie, and Maia Hallward cuts against the usual 
division between critical and complicit voices. They show that even explicit calls for dissent could serve 
as a form of complicity. As Wright explained it, she arrived at her self-awareness by working with left-
wing dissenters who expressed, unwillingly and perhaps unconsciously, what she called 
“uncomfortable entanglements with the histories and regimes they challenge” (130). While the image 
of “small business owners” owes its existence to competition, an ideal of solidarity also offers an 
affirmative image of excellence and professionalism—indeed, Bloch speaks of a “solidarity of the ages” 
(Craft 43). But giving up competition means committing to critical self-reflection while going beyond 
differences and interest-based groups. As Vincent Lloyd shows in this issue, James Baldwin and black 
feminists realized that solidarity alone could redefine the legitimate critique of power. Baldwin 
emphasized suffering—“The suffering of any people is really universal”—but the outcome was a 
dynamic call for action. Solidarity between struggles goes beyond Arendt’s commitment to 
international law and constitutional democracy, which all too often fail to perceive their own failures. 
Homo politicus will not obey the rules, pursuing instead a critical vision of power. Only once we see 
this can we safely separate complicity from dissent. Only then can we reconsider the principle of the 
political, not as a binary relation between friend and enemy, but as a network of solidarity, united 
against abuse and coercive power.  
As the editor of this special issue I am particularly grateful to a few esteemed scholars who helped 
me review the different articles: Gadi Algazi, Michael Allan, Nancy Armstrong, Orit Bashkin, Musa 
Budeiri, Thomas Docherty, Matan Kaminer, Chad Kautzer, Yuval Kremnitzer, Ethan Kleinberg, Liron 
Mor, Ori Sela, Andrew Sartori, Raef Zreik. I want to thank Daniella Gitlin for her brilliant suggestions 
and help in framing of the topic, discussed above. 
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